University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1925

Administration Determination of Public Land
Controversies
Henry L. McClintock

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
McClintock, Henry L., "Administration Determination of Public Land Controversies" (1925). Minnesota Law Review. 1461.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1461

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION
128
PUBLIC LAND CONTROVERSIES

OF

By HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*

IV.

V

HETHER the

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

determination

of controversies by the tri-

bunals of the land department is to be classed as executive justice or as judicial justice, is a question whose answer
would turn upon the exact definition of those terms, certainly
it would be close to the border line, however that line might
be drawn, While these tribunals are not technically courts,
the controversies they determine, especially where those controversies are between individual adverse parties, and the procedure by which they are determined conform more closely
to the questions and 'procedure of typical common law courts,
than do those with which some so-called courts, for example,
juvenile courts, deal. But the proper classification of the
tribunals is less important than the proper performance of
their functions. Whether they have succeeded in accomplishing the purpose for which they were developed cannot be certainly answered without a laborious study of them in actual
operation. Some features of their work can, however, be tested
to a certain extent by the standards of the administration of
justice according to law, using only materials available in
books.

Dean Pound has enumerated 2 9 six advantages of justice
according to law: (1) Law makes it possible to predict the
course which the administration of justice will take; (2) law
secures against errors of individual judgment; (3) law secures
against improper motives on the-part of those who administer
justice; (4) law provides the magistrate with standards in
which the settled ethical ideas of the community are formulated; (5) law gives the magistrate the benefit of all the experience of his predecessors; (6) law prevents sacrifice of
'Continued from 9 MINNESOTA LAW RE:viEw 420, 542.
*Assistant Professor, Law School, University of Minnesota.
13 Col. L. Rev. 696, 709.
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ultimate interests to the more obvious and pressing, but less
weighty, immediate interests.
The first of these advantages, predictability, is of great,
importance in the administration of the land system. Before
a man, especially a settler, expends his time and money in an
endeavor to comply with the public land laws, and thereby to
acquire some land, he wants to know just what is required of
him. It is of less importance to him what the requirements
are, than that he should know what they are, otherwise he
may lose the benefit of all his efforts for failing to comply
with a particular requirement which is relatively unimportant
and with which he would have complied if he had known it
in advance. The acts of Congress prescribe in general terms
what the requirements are, the rules and regulations give more
specific directions, but always there is the impossibility of
foreseeing the infinitely varied combinations of facts, so that
predictability involves some means of determining the process
by which the laws and rules will be applied to the facts. Our
common law accomplishes this by its technique of deciding
cases with reference to the precedents of prior decisions. The
land department has in terms adopted the principle of stare
decisis.130 Sometimes the rule is stated that the former dec-ision will be followed unless clearly contrary to law,""1 and
again it is stated that the previous executive construction of
a statute will not be changed except for cogent reasons." 2
The volumes of the reports of Land Decisions each contain a table of overruled and modified cas.es. In the volume
last published'3 3 there are over 350 cases listed as overruled
and 75 listed as modified. 34 Of these 23 are marked as being
now authority. At first sight these figures appear to indicate
that the doctrine of stare decisis is "more honored in the
breach than in the observance." An examination of twenty of
the overruling cases,, selected at random, except that they were
'In re Ranch Coste, (1883) 1 Land Dec. 232, 239; In re Wisconsin
R. R. Farm Mortgage Land Co., (1886) 5 Land Dec. 81, 92; In re State
of Ohio, (1890) 10 Land Dec. 394, 396; Smith v. Hatfield, (1893) 17 Land
Dec. 79; Bender v. Shimer, (1894) 19 Land Dec. 363, 365.
'Rees v. Central Pac. R. Co., (1886) 5 Land Dec. 277; Kansas v.
United States, (1886) 5 Land Dec. 712, 713.
'Taylor v. Yates, (1899) 8 Land Dec. 279; In re George-Big Knife,
(1891) 13 Land Dec. 511.
'48 Land Dec. XV-XXI.
'These figures are approximate only. Some cases are listed twice,
e. g., under California and state, so no exact count was made.
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all decided since 1913, shows that in only one case was there
any discussion of the doctrine 6f stare decisis, in two others
the prior cases was expressly overruled without any other reference to it,in four cases the earlier decision was held to be
contrary to statute and in four others the earlier decision was
held to be unsound in principle or contrary to the better doctrine. These eleven cases, or a little over half, are all cases
where the force of the earlier decision was expressly denied.
Of the other nine, three were overruled because of a subsequent change in the statutes, one because of a change in a
rule, and two because they were contrary to a subsequent
court decision. None of these were within the doctrine. Two
cases were overruled because there were conflicting lines of
decision, and one case, listed as overruled, was not mentioned
in the later case cited as overruling it but the reporter's fdotnote stated that the holding of the later case in effect .overruled the earlier one. These last two situations are perhaps
as frequent in court reports as we find them here.
Of the 23 listed as restored to authority, eight were so
restored by decisions since 1914 and these later decisions
have been examined. One was not a decision but a circular
of instruction that had been previously amended, and now
was restored to read as it did originally. Two decisions overruled prior decisions without noting that the overruled decisions had themselves overruled still earlier decisions, which
the reporter regarded as restoring the authority of the latter.
One decision noted that the rule established by an earlier case
had been overruled by two later cases but concluded, "upon
mature consideration"'" 5 that the later ones were unsound
and overruled them. The other four decisions had all been
overruled by the same decision, and later were restored by
the same decision. These cases are interesting examples of
the attitude of the department toward overruling opinions.
The four cases first overruled had held that default by the
widow and heirs of a homestead entryman in complying with
the statute would not avail the contestant if such default was
in good faith cured before the initiation of the contest. In
Hon v. Martihas"36
' there had been neither residence nor cultivation on the land before the entryman's death and there was good
1

"Braucht v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1914) 43 Land Dec. 536, 538.
'(1912) 41 Land Dec. 119.
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reason to believe the only cultivation thereafter was merely colorable. The assistant-secretary said:
"In some cases heretofore decided . . . the department,'
in its desire to do what it believed to be justice to the widows
and heirs of deceased entrymen, has been led into a somewhat
liberal interpretation of the letter of the statute above quoted
in order to meet extenuating circumstances in the cases under
consideration. Here, however, the matter is entirely without
complication. At the time this" contest came on for hearing
the plain requirements of the law had not been complied with,
and compliance therewith was no longer possible."
Notwithstanding the clear distinction on the facts thus
pointed out the earlier cases were expressly overruled in so far
as they conflicted with that decision.
It re Alice 0. Reder' 37 raised the same question again. The
38
held the default could
decision statd that Hon v. Martinas"
not be cured, and that the conclusion reached in that case was
probably correct, under the circumstances involved therein,
but some principles were stated in that decision which were
not in accord with the present views of the Department. It
therefore, modified the decision in Hon v. Martinas 39 to conform to the present views.
It is quite obvious that the Land Department uses the
term "overrule" in a much broader sense than do the courts,
and includes in overruled cases those in which the language
is merely limited to the particular facts by a later decision.
The explanation probably is that the department is much more
consciously "making law" by its decisions, than are the courts.
A large part of its work is the preparation of rules and regulations, which manifestly are laws, and naturally the principles stated in its decisions, prepared in the same office and
largely by the same men and printed in the same reports come
to be regarded as part of the legislative work of the department. That it does, not conceive of its function in making
these decisions as merely that of finding and applying the
law which has always existed is shown by In re Hall 140 where
an application for reconsideration of a rejected claim for repayment on the ground that under subsequent Departmental
rulings claimant was entitled to it was denied, the decision
'(1914) 43 Land
'(1912) 41 Land
'(1912) 41 Land
"4(1915) 44 Land

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.

196.

119.

119.
113.
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stating that a final adjudication would not be disturbed because of a subsequent change in the construction of the law
which governed the case at the time it was originally adjudi1 41
cated.
With that view of the effect of the opinion, it is wise for the
department, whenever it believes a rule has been stated too
broadly, to modify or overrule the opinion, thereby in effect
repealing a rule, but such cases must be eliminated in estimating whether the cases overruled are so numerous as to defeat
the right of the decisions of the department to claim the advantage of predictability, the first of the elements of justice
according to law.
In this connection attention may be called to the finality
of decisions by the department. Of course, when the patent
is already issued, or nothing remains to be done but the performance of the ministerial duty of issuing it, the jurisdiction
of the department over the land involved ceases, and the decisions are final so far: as the department is concerned.1 42 The
same principle applies where private rights become vested by
approval of a survey 43 or of a right of way.' 4 But so long
as the jurisdiction of the department continues, the secretary
145
is not bound by prior findings or rulings in the same case.
Where the register and receiver had issued a certificate on
a claim based on a settlement in Louisiana, under which possession had been held for twenty years, and bona fide purchasers had acquired rights, the successors of the district officers
could not cancel that certificate and award the land to another. 14
There is no statute fixing the period during which the
department can reconsider its decisions, and formerly the
practice permitted applications for review and rereview after
a rehearing. This practice has now been abolished by Rules
of Practice, Rule 84, and the decision of the secretary becomes
"It must be borne in mind that the department usually would not
apply the doctrine of res judicata where the controversy was solely between
an applicant and the government. See In re Robinson, (1914) 43 Land
Dec. 221, also a repayment case.
1 United States v. Schurz, (1880) 102 U. S. 378, 26 L. Ed. 167.
'Stone v. United States, (1864) 2 Wall. (U.S.) 525, 17 L. Ed. 765.
'"Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., (1893) 147 U. S. 165, 37
L. Ed. 123, 13 S. C. R_ 271.
14
Beley v. Naphtaly, (1898) 169 U. S. 353, 42 L. Ed. 775, 18 S. C. R.
354; Potter v. Hall, (1903) 189 U. S. 292,47 L. Ed. 817, 23 S. C. R. 545.
'"Tate v. Carney, (1860) 24 How. (U.S.) 357, 16 L. Ed. 693.
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final if no motion for rehearing is made within 30 days as required by Rule 83.
The second and third advantages of justice according to'
law, security against errors of individual judgment and
against improper motives on the part of those who administer
justice depend very largely on the same factors of selection,
training and control of those who decide controversies and
may be considered together.
The registers and receivers are very generally political
appointees and may be expected to regard their office as political rather than judicial in character. Their continued tenure in office depends upon the political success of their party,
not upon their own success in correctly deciding the questions
submitted to them. It is, therefore, not to be expected that,
where those questions involve political issues, or one of the
parties in the case has political influence, the register and receiver can render an impartial decision. Again the local officers have no special training for the work of deciding cases.
Even if, as is generally the case, one of them is a lawyer, he
is not particularly' apt to be of a judicial temperament and has
no special incentive to acquire or develop a rational technique
of deciding his cases. But the function of the registers and
receivers as judges is comparatively unimportant. Except that
due weight is given to their opinion as to the credibility of
witnesses who testified in person before them, the General
Land Office forms its decisions quite largely as that of a court
of first instance.
In our regular courts of law, control is exercised over trial
judges, to exclude arbitrary action by the judicial habit or
technique of deciding according to law, by the criticism of the
bar and by the right of appeal. In the General Land Office,
the decisiofi is nominally that of the commissioner or assistant commissioner, who are political appointees who need not
have, though they generally do have, legal training. Even if
they are selected because of their fitness for the office, it may
be their administrative, not their judicial fitness that is considered. If they actually decided the cases, and the appeals
from them were actually decided by the secretary of the interior, also a political officer, it would be hard to find any of
the forms of control exercised over them, which are exercised
over judges. But when we consider those by whom the deci-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

sions are actually framed, the situation is different. All of
these men are under the civil service, appointed originally because of their fitness, as well as that could be tested by examination. Their tenure does not depend on the popularity of
their decisions. -Most of the decisions are written, and all
must be approved by lawyers, who, during their service in the
office, can develop a habit and technique of deciding the particular types of cases they have to deal with much better than
the average trial judge who has to handle all the various
forms of cases, if not simultaneously, at least during a succession of short assignments to the different divisions of the
court. Because the decisions are not promulgated in the
names of those who write them, and most of them are written
without hearing a personal argument, the- criticism of the
bar cannot be as potent a check on the Land Department subordinates as on a judge. On the other hand there is the check
of the opinion of their associates and superiors in the office,
where their work is -known and where their future advancement is to be determined. There is no reason why the appeal
should not be as effective a control in the Land Department
as in a court. The question remains whether the Land Office
has an established tradition of judicial integrity. Former rule
of practice, 108, as it existed before 1886,147 authorized attorneys
to make verbal inquiries of the chiefs of divisions as to the
papers or status of a case but prohibited personal inquiries of
any other clerk in the division except in the presence or with
the consent of the head thereof. An assistant law clerk, who
was then performing duties similar to those of the present
Board of Law Review, testifying before a Senate investigating
committee in 1882.148 stated that, notwithstanding the rule
against conferences without permission, the attorneys for the
land grant railroads generally managed in some way to get
their views before the clerks who were considering their cases.
This was before the organization of the office had reached its
present complexity, and there seem to be no more recent criticisms along this line. In the present rules of practice, rule 90
covers the right of access to papers by attorneys but has no
provision as to consultation with clerks. The omission of that
"See In re Lamar, (1887) 5 Land Dec. 400.
"Sen.

Rep. 47th Cong, 1st sess. Rep. No. 362, p. 104, testimony of

J. W. Le Barfies.
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provision is some indication that the problem is no longer
existent. The rule could not prevent communication outside.
of the office and if it has been supplanted by a tradition of the
office, the control is more effective.
As in the appellate courts, we have the published reports
of opinions as a powerful check on arbitrary decisions, in the
Land Department we have the Land Decisions. In each of
these there have appeared since 1894 the names of the attorneys in the solicitor's office, who really prepare the decisions,
but there is nothing to show which decisions each of them
prepared. Here again, though, there would be the opinion of
the office to act as a check. The force of this office opinion
would increase with the length of service. Of the nineteen
men whose names appear in the first list, published in 1894,
two are still in the office. Of the twenty-five who were there
ten years ago, ten are still in the office and one other is first
assistant secretary, in whose name most of the opinions are
issued. The members of the board of appeal are appointed
by the secretary of the interior. The first board, appointed in
1915, was composed of three men who had been in the solicitor's office, one since 1912, one since 1908, and one since before
the first list was published in 1894. These three continued
to compose the board, notwithstanding several changes in the
office of secretary, including one change of political control:
until one of them became first assistant secretary, whereupon
the vacancy on the board was filled by the appointment of
another attorney who had been in the office since 1901. The*
fact that these appointments are not made for political reasons
is strong evidence that the trend of department opinion is toward an independent judicial treatment of the controversies
it must decide.
Of course, if personal or political pressure is strong
enough, either the Commissioner or the Secretary may disregard the opinion of the subordinates and decide as he
chooses.

4
According to In re Honolulu Consolidated Oil Co.1 0

that happened after the president had prevented Secretary
Lane from putting into effect, a decision reached by him, in
which the board of appeals unanimously concurred, and a contrary decision was rendered by Secretary Payne. who succeeded Secretary Lane, and who, it should be added, was a
"a(1921) 48 Land Dec. 303.
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lawyer of conspicuous ability. But it must be only in very
exceptional cases that such a thing would occur, for the organized opinion of men who have devoted years to a study of
the special field involved must have tremendous weight.
The other three advantages of justice according to law, a
fixed standard, the benefit of past experience, and the recognition of ultimate interests are secured by law, regardless of
the character of the tribunal which administers them. There
can be little doubt that the Land Department secures all of
them. Most of the questions dealt with are to be determined
by the application of rules of law, although the standard of
good faith must very often be applied. Even the equitable
adjudications are made, not solely with reference to the circumstances of the particular case, but in accordance with rules
prescribed by the board. 50
Dean Pound enumerates four disadvantages of law:' 1'
(1) Rules must be made for cases in gross and men in the
mass and must operate impersonally and more or less arbitrarily; (2) science and system carry with them a tendency
to make law an end rather than a means; (3) a developed system tends to attempt rules where they are not practicable and
to invade th'e legitimate domain of justice without law;
(4) as law formulates settled ethical ideas, it can not, in
periods of transition, accord with the more advanced conceptions of the" present.
The first and fourth of these are inherent in any system of
law. The third has little importance in the Land Department,
which deals exclusively with property rights, par excellence
the domain of law. The second disadvantage, the tendency
to mechanical justice, is particularly noticeable in matters of
procedure which ought to be regarded only as a means to
secure the proper decision of the controversy on the merits,
but which frequently operate to prevent such a decision, and
this suggests an inquiry as to how successful the Land Department procedure is in securing decisions on the merits.
Such an inquiry is particularly desirable in view of the almost
exclusive control of the Land Department over its own rules
of procedure and of the agitation at present looking towards
a similar control by the courts over procedure before them.
'R. S. sec. 2450.
ustice According to Law, 13 Col. L. Rev. 696, 712.

1
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Advocates of the plan to control procedure by court rules
claim that under that plan, where the rules are made by the
organ which is familiar with the problems involved and which*
must apply the rules, the great mass of procedural questions
which now occupy the time of our courts will be eliminated
and the cases will be much more often disposed of on their
merits, and the experience of the Land Department seems to
support that claim.
In the first two hundred pages of the last volume of the
Land Decisions' 152 there are 57 decisions in litigated cases reported. The reporter has written 96 syllabus paragraphs for
these cases, of which 89 deal with questions affecting the
substantial rights.of the parties and only 7 with matters of
procedure. In 15 of these cases the decision of the commissioner was reversed, one of the reversals was for error in holding an answer insufficient. In only 5 cases was it necessary
to send the record back for further proceedings and none of
these required whole new trial. Generally it was sent back
for taking proof on a point which the secretary deemed material, or to proceed with the hearing in accordance with the decision. The index to the same volume shows only 13 practice points, or 15 if we include evidence under practice. In
only three of these cases, involving 4 of the 13 points, was
there a reversal on the practice ground, one for refusing
a continuance asked because of contestant's sickness and refused on the erroneous theory the rules governing continuance for absence of witness applied, and the other two on
questions of the sufficiency of the pleadings which were, to a
large degree at least, substantive points. In the digest of the
first forty volumes of the Land Decisions, the title "Practice"
occupies 55 pages out of a total of 880 pages. It must be remembered that this title includes not only the subject matter
of the practice titles"in ordinary digests, but also the subject
matter of "Appeal and Error" which in the Second Decennial
Digest occupies 12 of the 23 volumes, or a larger percentage
of the contents than all of the title "Practice" in the Land Decisions Digest.
One great factor in limiting the number of practice questions
that have to be decided is the power of the department to waive
breaches of the rules of practice when the substantial interests
"'Vol. 48.
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of adverse parties are not thereby affected. This power was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Lytle v. Arkansas, 53
decided in 1850. The commissioner had promulgated a rule that
proof of pre-emption claims must be taken in the presence of the
register and receiver, but the claim involved in that case had been
allowed though the proof was taken in the presence of the register
only. Mr. Justice McLean, 54 writing the majority opinion, said:
"The law did not require the presence of the land officers
when the proof was taken, but, in the exercise of his discretion,
the commissioner required the proof to be so taken. Having power
to impose this regulation, the commissioner had the power to dispose with it, for reasons which might be satisfactory to him." 55
A similar conclusion was reached in Knight v. United States
Land Association, 56 where the objection that the appeal to the
secretary of the interior was not in regular form was dismissed
with the remark that it was immaterial whether the appeal was
regular according to the established rules of the department or
whether the secretary. on his own motion takes up the case and
disposes of it in accordance with law and justice. This power has
been frequently exercised in the reported decisions.157 Sometimes
the department has supported its power to disregard its rules on
the analogy of the exercise of a similar power by the courts with
reference to their rules. 158 Of course, this power will not be exercised to the prejudice of rights acquired in reliance on the rule, 59
and the secretary will not in every case exercise supervisory jurisdiction where the party has lost his rights to appeal by failure to
comply with the rules. 60 The circuit court of appeals for the
eighth circuit has strongly objected to the power of waiving
breaches of the rules of procedure, 161'but the situation before it
was one where clearly the rule should have been 4plied, for the
1(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 314, 13 L. Ed. 153.
Xfr. Justice McLean had served as Commissioner of the General
Land Office before his elevation to the Supreme Bench.
'(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 314, 332, 13 L. Ed. 153.
"(1891) 142 U. S. 161, 181, 35 L. Ed. 974, 12 S. C. R. 258.
"'TSee In re Oregon, (1889) 9 Land Dec. 360; In re Pike's Peak Lode,
(1892) 14 Land Dec. 47.
"'Caldonia Min. Co. v. Rowen, (1883) 2 Land Dec. 714; Hawkeye
Placer v. Gray Eagle Placer, (1892) 15 Land Dec. 45.
" Cudney v. Flannery, (1882) 1 Land Dec. 165; In re Dole, (1884) 3
Land Dec. 214; In re Fuss, (1886) 5 Land Dec. 167, 169; Oliver v. Thomas,
(1886) 5 Land Dec. 289, 292; Watts v. Forsyth, (1887) 5 Land Dec. 624.
'"Stevens v. Robinson, (1886). 5 Land Dec. 111, 112; Cassidy v. Arey,
(1886) 5 Land Dec. 235, 236; the language in these decisions, standing
alone, might be construed as denying the power to exercise supervision.
"Germania Iron Co. v. James, (1898) 32 C. C. A. 348, 89 Fed. 811, 813.
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result -of the decision of the Land Department was to award the
land to one who had made an entry, in violation of a rule, before
the decision of the department cancelling a prior entry had been'
received at the local office, and thereby to penalize the observance
of the rule by adverse claimants who waited until the decision was
received.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Practic6 provides for noting objections
to evidence, apparently recognizing the applicability of the rules of
evidence, and an examination of the title "Evidence" in the digest
of the Land Decisions shows that those rules are recognized and applied. But here, again, the mechanical application of technical
rules is not manifest. In this digest, covering forty volumes of
reports there are 235 paragraphs under the title of "Evidence,"
of which 61 relate to depositions, 23 to burden of proof and 15 to
presumptions. In the index to volume 48 there are no paragraphs
under the title "Evidence" and of the cross references under that
title, only two relate to admissibility of evidence. Such a situation
is one we would expect in view of the fact that the commissioner
and secretary review the facts as well as the law so that there is
no occasion to reverse a decision because of the reception of incompetent evidence, but that evidence can be disregarded.
The decisions of the department are based on the evidence
introduced The register and receiver can inspect the premises,
provided they give notice to the parties, but they can use their
knowledge obtained by such inspection only to understand the evidence, not as a substitute for it. 26 2 This follows what is probably

the orthodox common law rule as to the effect of a view by the
jury and, in the Land Department, is supported by the necessity
of having the facts in the record on which the decision must be
based, but it is hard to see how the officers could separate their
mental processes in the manner required by the rule, and the interests of justice would probably be better served by permitting them
to state in the record- the physical conditions noted by them, and
having that statement considered with the other evidence.
On the whole, the Land Department has achieved a large degress of success in attempting to give speedy and cheap adjudication of a vast number of litigated controversies, while at the same
time preserving to a very large degree the safeguards of the administration of justice according to law, as developed by our courts
of common law.
"'Tannehill v. Shannon, (1888) 6 Land Dec. 626; Menzel v. Valear,
(1893) 16 Land Dec. 95; Majors v. Rinda, (1897) 24 Land Dec. 277.
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V.

RELATIONS WITH THE COURTS

Congress has never provided for review by the courts of the
decisions of the Land Department, though there has been some
demand for such review,"" and that demand was supported at one
time by President Taft. It could not well be claimed that a right
to such review was guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the constitution since, insofar as the decision is between the applicant and
the government, the final determination of the rights of the applicant by the department can be made a condition to the disposition
of the government's property, and insofar as it is between adverse
claimants, the question can be considered by the courts in a suit
in equity after the government has conveyed the title to either.
But numerous attempts have been made to induce the courts
to control the action of the department by injunction or mandamus. The same principles apply in determining the right to either
of these remedies. If the act is of such a nature that the performance of it cannot be compelled by mandamus, the performance of it cannot.be restrained by injunction. 16 4 The general
rule that courts will not interfere to control the acts of executive
officers in matters committed to their judgment and discretion
applies. 1 5 As a general principle, the acts of the department are
discretionary until the right to the land has become vested in the
applicarit. The court has enjoined a secretary from annulling the
act of a predecessor by which a right of way for a railroad over
the public lands had become vested, 66 has required the issuance
of a patent for an Indian allotment, the right to which had become
vested 67 and has enjoined him from entertaining proceedings
which cast a cloud on the title to a Mexican grant which had become vested.' 68 In the last case the court said that the crux of
the case was whether title had passed out of the United States.
This principle does not seem to have been observed in the early
case of Litchfield v. The Register 6 9 where an irijunction to re'"Finney, Board of Appeals, Dept. of Int., 10 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 290,
292.

"'Gaines v. Thompson, (1869) 7 Wall. ('U.S.) 347, 19 L. Ed. 62;
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., (1893) 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. Ed. 123,
13 S. C. R. 271.
'"Ibid.
"Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., (1893) 147 U. S. 165, 37
L. Ed. 123, 13 S. C. R. 271.
"*Ballinger v. United States, (1910) 216 U. S. 240, 54 L. Ed. 464, 30
S. C. R. 338.
!Lane v. Watts, (1914) 234 U. S. 525, 58 L. Ed. 1440, 34 S. C. R_ 965.
'(1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 575, 19 L. Ed. 681.
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strain the consideration of pre-emption entries was refused, though
the land was claimed under a grant to the state of Iowa and the
court said the determination of that question involved judgment
and discretion. The decision can be sustained on the other grounds
stated in the opinion that if the injunction were granted the preemption claimants, who were not parties, would have no remedy
for the determination of their claims, whereas if it were denied
and the secretary allowed the claims, the complainant would still
have his remedy by bill in equity. In Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co.to it was apparently settled that the only jurisdictional
fact as to which the decision of the department could be collaterally attacked was that the land involved was a part of the public
domain. The principle that the title of the government must be
divested before there is a right to mandamus was applied in Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane,'7 ' where the entry had been cancelled
for fraud after the land had been sold to the townsite company
which claimed to have purchased in ignorance of the fraud. The
court denied the writ on the ground that the company had only
an equity and was seeking by the writ to acquire the legal title.
The construction of the applicable statutes is a matter which
has been committed to the judgment of the Land Department and
the courts will not interfere with such construction unless the
meaning of the act is plain and the construction of it is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary. A construction of "vacant land" as not
including land in actual possession under local mining customs," 2
of a requirement of a statement of the character of the land verified by oath of the applicant as requiring pefsonal knowledge by
the applicant,173 of "opening or improvement" on coal claims as requiring the opening and development of a producing mine and not
mere prospecting work, 7 4 and of an act withdrawing land from
entry temporarily as requiring only the suspension, not the rejection of entries 7 - were held to be the exercise of judgment and not
controllable. But a construction of a statute entitling the entryman to patent within two years after the issuance of the receiver's
1(1893) 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. Ed. 123, 13 S. C. R. 271.
xT(1917)' 245 U. S. 308, 62 L. Ed. 309, 38 S. C. R. 99.

"'United States. ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, (1903) 190
U. S. 316, 47 L. Ed. 1073, 23 S. C. R. 698.
"United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, (1912) 223 U. S. 683, 56 L. Ed.
610, 32 S. C. R. 356.

...United States ex rel. Alaska, etc., Co. v. Lane, (1919) 250 U. S. 549,
63 L. Ed. 1135, 40 S. C. R. 33.
"'United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, (1920) 254 U. S. 343, 65 L. Ed.
295, 41 S. C. R. 131.
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receipt when there was no pending contest or protest, as authorizing the cancellation of an entry because a report to the department
recommending cancellation had been received before the expiration of the two years, was held to be so arbitrary as to be controllable, in view of the meaning of "contest" and ."protest" in land
proceedings and the purpose of the statute to prevent indefinite
176
delay in the investigation of the validity of entries.
Even where the secretary directed patent to issue after the
confirmation by Congress of one of the claims while an application of the adverse claimant for rehearing was pending before the
secretary, and it was contended the confirming act was unconstitutional, the court stated that the secretary's determination of conflicting rights could not be controlled, and that the application was
an attempt to use mandamus as a writ of error.17 7 But this case
does not necessarily support the proposition that the secretary's
determination of a constitutional question cannot be controlled by
mandamus or injunction, since it could not be shown his action
was based on the statute and not on his decision of the rights of
the claimants, and the patent had already been issued and could
not be revoked by him. Apparently the court has never been
called upon to determine its power to control action of the Land
Department based upon statutes alleged to be invalid.
If the Land Department in the exercise of its discretion rejects all claims to a tract of land, there is no redress for the parties, even though the rejection is based on a construction of the
law which is in fact erroneous. If patent has been issued to one
of the claimants, the legal title has passed to that claimant, and
the patent is conclusive as to his ownership of the land in all actions at law.771 But a court of equity can require the holder of
the patent, as it can the holder of any legal title, to convey it to
another who has a better equitable right to the land or can declare
the holder a trustee 79 In the leading case of Johnson v.Towsley 80 the scope of the inquiry in such a suit was outlined, and it
was held in effect that three questions could be considered, whether
the action of the department was procured by fraud, imposition or
mistake, whether the department had misconstrued the law and
"Lane v. Hogland, (1917) 244 U. S. 174, 61 L. Ed. 1066, 37 S. C. R.

558. .,In re Emplem, (1896)- 161 U. S. 52, 40 L. Ed. 613, 16 S. C. R. 487.
."Bagnall v. Broderick, (1839)"13 Pet. (U.S.) 436, 10 L. Ed. 235.
"Lindsey v. Hawes, (1839) 2 Black (U.S.) 554, 17 L. Ed. 265.
"'(1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 72, 20 L. Ed. 485. See ante p. 438.
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whether there were equities between the parties themselves which
required the patentee to hold for the benefit of the other. The
third question is not one on which the department could pass, but'
in determining the other two the courts have indirectly exercised
a control over the department which has been of more far-reaching
effect than the direct control. A consideration of their attitude
toward the department in these suits is worth noticing.
The courts accept the findings of the department on controverted questions of fact, in subsequent suits in equity concerning
the title to the land. 8 1 At first the court seemed to hold that the
decision of the Department could be set aside for fraud consisting
only of perjury in the proofs submitted. 8 2 But later cases have
applied the rule which governs attacks on court judgments and
decrees for fraud and decline to grant relief for perjury at the
hearings, the consideration of which would require a retrial of the
issues. 83 In Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States,'"' the
court said in the course of its opinion that a homestead patent
could be annulled if the proof of residence was false, but the holding in the case was that such fraud did not render the patent void,
and the title of a bona fide purchaser thereunder could not be defeated. The state and lower United States courts follow the rule
that the fraud-must be more than false testimony at the hearing. 85
In determining questions of law on which the Department has
previously passed the courts give special force to the rule that the
construction of a statute by the executive department entrusted
with its enforcement is entitled to great weight. In Hawley
88
v. Diller,'
Mr. Justice Harlan said that the rule was first stated
by Mr. Justice Miller in the circuit court for Nebraska' s7 and had
been followed in numerous decisions. The rule may have been
formulated by Mr. Justice Miller, but the principle underlying it
had been recognized in Barnard'sHeirs v. Ashley's Heirs.ss
'Baldwin v. Starks,. (1882) 107 U. S. 463, 27 L. Ed. 526, 2 S. C. R.
473; Lee v. Johnson, (1885) 116 U. S. 48, 29 L. Ed. 570, 6 S. C. R. 249;
Gardner v. Bonesteel, (1901) 180 U. S. 362, 45 L. Ed. 574, 31 S. C. R.
399; Hill v. McCord, (1904) 195 U. S. 395, 49 L. Ed. 251, 25 S. C. R. 96.
"Minnesota v. Bachelder, (1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 109, 17 L. Ed. 551.
See ante, p. 437.
'UtJnted States v. Throckmorton, (1878) 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93;
Steel v. St. Louis Smelting and Ref. Co., (1882) 106 U. S. 447, 27 L. Ed.
226, 1 S. C. R. 389.
"*(1887) 123 U. S. 307, 31 L. Ed. 182, 8 S. C. R. 131.
'32 Cyc. 1052 and cases cited in note 15.
"(1900) 178 U. S. 475, 44 L. Ed. 1157, 20 S. C. R. 986.

'1 Wool. (U. S. C. C.) 340.
1(1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 43, 45, 15 L. Ed. 285. See ante page 435.
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White charges that the Land Department has "disregarded
a Supreme Court decision and an act of Congress, apparently to
favor railroad interests." To support his charge he refers to the
testimony of one of the law clerks at a Senate hearing in 1882.289
The portions of the testimony quoted by him seem to support his
charge, but a reading of the whole testimony 90 shows that the
department opinion criticized purported to follow the Supreme
Court decision not to disregard it. He states that the uniform
ruling of the department had been that the grant to the railroad
within the indemnity limits 91 took effect at the same time as that
within the granted limits, but that the Supreme Court in Ryan v.
Central Pacific R. Co.,1 92 said that the rights within the indemnity
limits were merely "floats" which attached to the specific land
when the latter was selected. This was the contention of the railroad in that case as the lands in controversy were not open to
entry at the time of original grant, but were when the indemnity
selection was made. The witness charged that the subsequent
holding of the department that land covered by an entry at the
time of the indemnity selection, but thereafter abandoned by the
entryman and entered by a purchaser of his improvements, belonged to the railroad was contrary to the cited decision of the
Supreme Court and that after two years and a half of delay the
Department adopted the construction of the witness.
As to the Act of Congress, he charged that the department
had rendered a decision contrary to the Act April 21, 1876, protecting the settlers in certain claims against the railroads, that when
the statute was called to the department's attention- it modified
its decision to conform, but that the original decision was later
followed in other cases without noticing the nodification.
Though the witness did, in other parts of his testimony, intimate the railroad attorneys improperly influenced the clerks in
the office, the point he was trying to make principally was that
the force was insufficient for the proper consideration of the cases
it had to decide.
'"Administration of G. L. 0., pp. 151-56.
'"Testimony of J. W. Le Barnes, Sen. Rep. 47th Cong. 1st sess., Rep.
No. 362, pp. 99 ff., 193 fif.
"Land grants in aid of railroads generally granted each odd numbered section, not mineral or already settled upon, within a specified distance of the line of the road, and then provided that in lieu of the lands
excepted from that grant, the railroad might select other lands within
zones still further from the railroads. The lands so selected were designated indemnity or lieu lands.
'(1878) 99 U. S. 382, 25 L. Ed. 305.
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But later a case did arise when the department refused to
follow the language of a Supreme Court decision, and again railroad land grants were involved. In Sjoli v. Dreschel,193 the Court'
stated that the result of the holdings in prior cases was that the
railroad acquired no interest in particular lands in the indemnity
limits until the selections were approved by the secretary. Notwithstanding this plain language, the department, fortified by the
opinions of two attorneys general, continued to regard the lands
as withdrawn from entry from the date of the selection. Six
years after its former decision, the question again came before
the Supreme Court."" Mr. Justice White, writing the opinion of
the court, said that Sjoli v. Dreschel was not an authoritative
opinion, since in that case the settlement actually was made before
the railroad's selection. (The Land Department had awarded the
land to the settler on that ground.) The general language of that
case must be restricted to the particular facts, to follow the reasoning would overthrow the uniforni rule by which the Land Department has administered land grants from the beginning. Mr.
Justice Harlan, who had written the opinion in Sjoli v. Dreschel,
and Mr. Justice Day dissented.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The development of the administrative machinery in the land
office for the determination of controversies arising over the disposition of the public lands cannot be ascribed to any preconceived
preference for administrative as distinguished from judicial procedure. For, as we have seen, in the beginning both the land department and the courts were apparently of the opinion that such
controversies should be left for the decision of the courts whenever that decision could be obtained. It cannot be ascribed to the
character of the questions involved, for, generally, these questions
are simply those of compliance by the claimant with the requirements of law, or of a contest between rival claimants over right
to possession of land; both of which questions are of a nature
that has always been regarded as being within the peculiar province
of the courts to determine. Nor can the development of this machinery be ascribed to any general tendency of the times favoring
administrative, as against judicial, determinations of* questions,
since the development took place during the first eighty years of
the nineteenth century, during which time, in almost every other
'-(1905) 199 U. S. 564, 50 L. Ed. 311, 26 S. C. R. 154.
Weverhaeuser v. Hoyt, (1911) 219.11.S. 380, 55 L. Ed. 258, 31 S. C.

R. 300.
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field, the courts were extending their jurisdiction over controversies unknown to the courts in England, to such an extent that
it was doubtful whether any question could be considered as not
within the jurisdiction of the courts. The only reason that can
be found for the development of this machinery and for the change
in the attitude of the courts and of the land department with reference to the determination of these controversies, is the impossibility of handling the volume of business that the land department
had to handle by any ordinary court machinery. The amount of
work done by the land department in the time of, its greatest activity was so great that "doing a land office business" became proverbial.
Today our courts themselves are confronted with a similar
problem, especially in our larger cities. The volume of business
is becoming too great for our present judicial machinery to handle
efficiently, and the problem of how the work can be speeded up
has been the subject of much earnest discussion. Is it possible that
a study of the methods by which the land department solved a
similar problem during the last century will be of assistance at the
present time? Two of the features of the organization of the land
department which have been prominent in aiding it to expedite its
business, the centralized administration of all the tribunals in one
department, and the control by the department of its own procedure have been advocated by those proposing reforms of our
judicial machinery. Here in our own experience we have an opportunity to study the advantages and defects of these suggested
reforms.
Of course, the organization of the land department could not
be transferred bodily to the courts, but if it could be demonstrated
that these two principles have successfully operated in the land
department, is there not good reason to believe that the same principles, in a form adapted to the different conditions, will be equally
beneficial in aiding the courts to meet the problem? That the land
department has been successful on the whole in meeting its problems can safely be affirmed, when we consider the vastness of the
task with which it was confronted, the almost negligible delay with
which that*task was performed, as contrasted with the delay incident to court procedure, and the general satisfaction with the resuits obtained by the department, manifested by the increasing respect of the courts for the decisions of that department, and more
clearly by the almost total absence of interference by Congress
with the operations of the department.

